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MENTAL ILLNESS
MENTAL ILLNESS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
But as soon as a man, through lack of character,
takes refuge in doctrine, as soon as crime reasons about
itself, it multiplies like reason itself and assumes all the
aspects of the syllogism. Once crime was as solitary as
a cry of protest; now it is as universal as science. Yes-
terday it was put on trial; today it determines the law.
Camus
The Rebel
To trace the law of criminal justice from M'Naghten' to
Durham2 and beyond is to know what it means to say: "Yes-
terday crime was put on trial; today it determines the law."
The ancient requirement for criminal responsibility of a culp-
able state of mind-said by many to be the essence of crime
itselF3-has been so eroded away by ever-broadening concepts
of mental illness as to verge at times on total meaninglessness.
It would appear that psychiatry was never pleased with
the M'Naghten formulation of rules of insanity as a criminal
defense. To base excuse from criminal responsibility upon
"a defect of reason!' as M'Naghten did4 was even at the time
an affront to psychiatry. Although still in its first century of
development at the time of M'Naghten and evidencing almost
1 M'Naghten's Case, 10 CL. & Fn. 200, 210, 8 ENG. REP. 718, 722
(H. L. 1843).
2 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
3 See Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); 1 J.
BISHOP, CRmnmIAL LAW § 287 (9th ed. 1930); Sayre, Mens
Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 974 (1932).
4 The gist of the M'Naghten Rule is that "to establish a de-
fence on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party ac-
cused was labouring under such a deffect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to knw the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong." 10 CL. & F N. at
210, 8 ENG. REP. at 722 (emphasis added).
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exclusively a belief that all abnormal behavior has its cause
in some corresponding physical abnormality, psychiatry had
begun to speak in terms of defects of the will. Dr. Isaac Ray,
a pioneer in the field of forensic psychiatry whose influence
is still being felt in almost every legal reform made in the
area of criminal responsibility, was the first and strongest
American critic of M'Naghten. Even before M'Naghten Ray
had attacked "knowledge of right and wrong" tests of crim-
inal responsibility by arguing that mental disorders were not
limited to the intellect. Elaborating in 1871 upon ideas he had
expressed shortly after the M'Naghten rules were devised,
Ray stated:
[W]ith hardly a single exception these "rules of
law" on the subject of insanity are in conflict with the
well-settled facts of mental disease. They would never
have been made, we are quite sure, by persons prac-
tically acquainted with the operations of the insane
mind. To such it is well known that in every hospital
for the insane are patients capable of distinguishing
between right and wrong, knowing well enough how to
appreciate the nature and legal consequences of their
acts, acknowledging the sanctions of religion, and never
acting from irresistible impulses, but deliberately and
shrewdly. Is this all to be utterly ignored in courts of
justice?5
As early as 1838, five years before M'Naghten, Ray had
challenged other psychiatrists to exert an influence upon the
law. In the preface to his first edition of A Treatise on the
Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, he wrote:
Few, probably, whose attention has not been par-
ticularly directed to the subject, are aware, how far the
condition of the law relative to insanity is behind the
present state of our knowledge concerning that dis-
ease .... This, no doubt, is mainly the fault of medical
men themselves, who have neglected to obtain for the
results of their researches, that influence on the law of
5 I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF IN-
SAN=rY 344 (5th ed. 1871).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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insanity which they have exerted on its pathology and
therapeutics.6
The first tangible results of Ray's efforts to modify the
law of criminal responsibility may be seen in the opinion
of Justice Doe of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in
State v. Pike,7 decided in 1869. Ray argued that whether
an alleged mental disorder excused the defendant or not was
a question of fact for the jury to decide. His correspondence
on this point with Justice Doe is credited with helping to
bring about the New Hampshire rule regarding criminal re-
sponsibility. The New Hampshire rule, in effect in that state
today and gaining wider acceptance in principle, rejects all
legal definitions of insanity and leaves the question to the
jury: "It was, for a long time, supposed that men, however
insane, if they knew an act to be wrong, could refrain from
doing it. But whether that supposition is correct or not, is a
pure question of fact."8 The court reasoned further that the
question of fact was purely a medical one, to be answered by
the testimony of medical men. Ray's victory was total. The
law had been pre-empted in favor of medicine.
But the New Hampshire rule did not replace M'Naghten
anywhere but in New Hampshire, and psychiatry was grow-
ing increasingly impatient with the law as it expanded its
own role in human knowledge and affairs. The law had be-
come progressively cognizant of the strides legitimate psy-
chiatry was making, but this was seen generally only in more
liberal interpretations of the ''Naghten rule.
It was in the second half of the nineteenth century that
psychiatry reached true incompatibility with existing legal
definitions of criminal responsibility. A hostile coexistence
has prevailed ever since. Every concession made to reconcile
criminal law theory with psychiatry has been on the part
6 Cited in W. OVERHOLsER, THE PSYcIATRIST AmD THE LAw 4
(1953).
7 49 N. H. 399 (1869).
8 Id. at 437.
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of the law. They have all been mistakes. The two develop-
ments in psychiatry at this time which have plagued efforts
at reconciliation where the widespread recognition of func-
tional as opposed to organic mental disorders and the equally
well accepted theory of the "unconscious". Whereas Ray had
recognized defects of the will and had emphasized the role
of the emotions, or affects as he termed them, in human be-
havior, Freud talked about nothing else. His postulation of
the "unconscious" to explain abnormal behavior and the ac-
cent throughout psychiatry upon the emotional rather than,
or virtually to the exclusion of, the intellectual aspect of hu-
man behavior resulted in the acceptance in some jurisdictions
of the defense of the "irresistible impulse".9 Despite the obvi-
ous philosophical, if not medical, impossibility of distinguishing
between the true irresistible impulse and the impulse which
is simply surrendered to, some fourteen states and the federal
courts have incorporated the concept into law as a release
from criminal responsibility.10 The United States Supreme
Court has given tacit approval to the doctrine.1
Freud's position regarding the relationship between psy-
9 It is interesting that psychiatrists' chief criticism of
M'Naghten has long been that it requires an erroneous view
of the personality in that man's cognitive and conative pro-
cesses must be considered separate and distinct in order to
apply it. In arguing for the irresistible impulse test they
have taken the same approach. To say a person may "know
right from wrong", and yet not be able to resist certain
impulses-may function perfectly well cognitively but not
conatively-is also to effectively dis-integrate the person-
ality. Psychiatry has yet to improve upon Plato's imagery
of each man's driving both a black horse and a white horse
and being responsible to let neither get out of check.
10 Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960)
(dictum) Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957) (dictum).
1 Hotema v. United States, 186 U.S. 413, 420 (1902); Davis v.
United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897).
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chiatry and the criminal law was certainly unlike that of
Ray, and almost unique among psychiatrists generally. His
direct comments on the matter were rare, but when they
came they expressed without fail his strong belief that psy-
chiatric or psychological findings should not change what
the court's verdict in a case would otherwise have been. None-
theless, psychiatric theory, and especially Freud's own con-
tributions to it, began to play a larger and larger role in crim-
inal proceedings. There were no milestones of legal reform
such as the M'Naghten rule, the New Hampshire rule, or the
irresistible impulse doctrine to point to in the first half of
this century, but the impact of psychiatry on the law was un-
doubtedly greater than before.
This impact was seen probably more clearly in the re-
lated areas of penology, probation and parole, and social work.
But it reached the courtroom, too. Jurists and juries began
recognizing excusing conditions of a psychiatric nature re-
gardless of statutory or case law definition. Skilled lawyers
who read Freud, such as Darrow, won acquittals or greatly
reduced sentences by showing how, given the defendant's
background and certain events leading up to the crime, he
could not have acted otherwise. The next step was then in-
evitable. Criminal behavior itself began to be viewed in some
quarters as a form of mental illness. The derogation of mens
rea was complete.
Ray and others had spoken of "moral insanity" more than
a hundred years ago, meaning essentially what is meant to-
day by the terms psychopathic and sociopathic personality.
Although psychiatry classifies persons with such a condi-
tion neither psychotic nor neurotic, it still considers them
mentally ill. 12 It was not too surprising, then, when a 1954
12 In 1952 the American Psychiatric Association removed psy-
chopathic personality disturbance and sociopathic person-
ality disturbance from the non-disease category in its Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual and placed them in a disease
category.
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decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit13 resulted in later trials in the find-
ing "not guilty by reason of insanity" when the criminal
act was shown to have been produced by a psychopathic
condition. 4 Such rulings are as vacuous as the tautology they
stand for-that criminal behavior is the product of a crim-
inal mind.
Perhaps no judicial decision has pleased psychiatry more
than Durham v. United States5 which led to empty holdings
such as the above. Durham is the most recent, significant legal
reform regarding criminal responsibility. Although no other
jurisdiction has adopted the Durham rule, its acceptance in
principle has been wide spread, and its impact and ramifica-
tions have been great.16 The Durham test is simply that "an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect".17 The reason-
ing was:
We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-
wrong test is inadequate in that (a) it does not take
sufficient account of psychic realities and scientific
knowledge, and (b) it is based upon one symptom and
so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances. We
find that the "irresistible impulse" test is also inade-
quate in that it gives no recognition to mental illness
characterized by brooding and reflection and so rele-
gates acts caused by such illness to the application of
the inadequate right-wrong test. We conclude that a
broader test should be adopted.' 8
The court in Durham acknowledged its indebtedness to
13 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
14 Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
O'Bierne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652 (D.D.C. 1961).
15 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
16 Sec. S. GLUEcK, LAW AND PsYcHIATRY 4 (1962).
17 214 F.2d at 874.
18 Id.
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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the report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
which proposed in 1953:
The Jury must be satisfied that at the time of com-
mitting the act, the accused, as a result of disease of the
mind or mental deficiency, (a) did not know the nature
and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it was
wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from
committing it .... 19
The American Law Institute has proposed yet another
test:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.20
This formula, in substantially the same form as proposed,
was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in United States v. Currens.2 1 The court did re-
ject the phrase "to appreciate the criminality of his conduct"
because of its "overemphasis of the cognitive element in crim-
inal responsibility," again revealing, as the reform proposals
themselves do also, a bias toward a psychiatric view of be-
havior which it is believed can be shown to be neither philo-
sophically nor scientifically valid, nor the kind of structure
upon which society may safely build a system for regulating
social relationships. Moreover, it is apparent that any view of
man which puts forth an irrational existence, on the premise
that human behavior is not consciously chosen but uncon-
sciously driven, is so ridden with self-contradictions that no
coherent system of criminal justice may be postulated upon
it. Still, psychiatry's most fundamental weakness is its failure
to say who is responsible.
19 ROYAL CoavMIssIox ON CAPITAL PumSHNnmENT, REPORT, Ill
(Crnd. No. 8932, 1953).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
21 290 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1961).
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WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty s ai d in
rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose
it to mean-neither more nor less."
Lewis Carroll
Through the Looking-Glass
The basic postulate of our criminal law, in the words of
Dean Roscoe Pound, as quoted by Mr. Justice Jackson in
Morissette v. United States, 2 is "a free agent confronted with
a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing
freely to do wrong."2 How mental illness affects this basic
postulate is almost assuredly the most vexing problem to
confront any society committed to the principle of justice for
all. Most problems in providing equal justice arise and be-
come troublesome in the practical application of ideas; this
one does so in its very conception.
Judge David Bazelon, author of the Durham opinion,
couches his conception of the problem as follows:
Evil, of course can only be punished or forgiven. But
illness is supposed to be ameliorated or cured. Thus the
name we put to our failures makes a difference. We all
tend to believe in free will when we entertain hopes for
the future, but switch to determinism when recalling
our past failures. I suggest we extend the same con-
sideration to the failure of others.24
Judge Bazelon has undoubtedly cast his lot with psycho-
dynamic concepts of human behavior, as has almost every
other reformer or would be reformer of M'Naghten. The tri-
umph in this century of psychodynamic, or Freudian, inter-
pretations of human behavior over all others has been virtually
absolute. When the law has yielded to psychiatry, one may
be quite sure it is Freudian psychiatry that has been yielded
22 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
23 Id. at 250.
24 Bazelon, The Awesome Decision, SAT. EVE. POST, Jan. 23,
1950, at 56.
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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to. Legal questions of criminal responsibility apparently more
and more will be settled by resort to psychodynamic con-
cepts. Yet even the most cursory examination of those con-
cepts will show why they cannot be depended upon to tell
the law who is responsible.
The model of psychodynamic theory, from its inception,
has been that of Newtonian physics. Freud theorized that
human affairs are no different fundamentally from other
natural events, which he accepted were irrevocably deter-
mined by prior events. In order to explain human behavior,
Freud developed the concept of the "unconscious", and the
theory that men's actions are determined by inherited instincts,
or drives, and past experiences, the psychic effects of which
are stored in the "unconscious". This is of necessity a closed
concept, even though Freud and his successors have un-
wittingly suspended its logic in certain instances, the most
notable being therapy itself.25
Determinism in the physical sciences was abandoned by
most scientists after Heisenberg's "principle of indetermin-
acy" was established and quantum theory recognized. Many
scientists saw in this development their first honest oppor-
tunity to believe in man's moral responsibility. A large num-
ber of them published books and articles expressing their
25 The success of psychoanalysis is said to depend upon the
patient's gaining an understanding of and insight into his
past experiences (his "unconscious"); and in such a way
being able to change, himself, the course of his behavior.
But his understanding or insight must also be determined
by his past experiences. In other words, what is determined
is determined.
There is another serious flaw in the theory of the "un-
conscious". The mechanism of repression purportedly
"stocks" the "unconscious"--shoves things unwanted on the
conscious level back into the "unconscious". But why do
some repress many more things than others? What agent
is responsible for the operation of the mechanism of rpres-
sion? Is the individual responsible for the content of his
"unconscious"?
19681
9
Riggs: Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1968
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
great relief that religious and ethical concepts might now be
possible of rationalization. This reaction to the principle of
indeterminacy was puzzling, to say the least. The principle
established that events in the sub-atomic world cannot be
predicted, that they are capricious. Does it support the con-
cept of man's moral responsibility to say that his behavior,
like sub-atomic particles, is capricious? No. In fact, it is just
as damaging to that concept as to say his behavior is de-
termined by elements beyond his control. In either case he
could not be considered responsible.2 Quantum physics does
not affirm man's freedom of will any more than Newtonian
physics denied it. It does, however, destroy the Freudian psy-
chodynamic model of human behavior.
Determinism in the area of human behavior, the theory
that man is not free, has no responsibility for his behavior,
rests upon an equivocal way of viewing man. We do not ex-
cuse a Hitler of his behavior simply because he was once an
innocent infant. I do not excuse myself of my misconduct
today because of what happened yesterday. It is the "I" of
today that commits the act of today. It is whatever I am at
present which chooses to act in a certain way. It is what-
ever I am at present which is responsible. Perhaps whenever
we havq misgivings, as Judge Bazelon does, about holding
a person responsible for his behavior at a certain point in
26 Neither freedom of the will nor any other metaphysical
truth can be proved or disproved by reference to the sphere
of natural phenomena, whose categories quite naturally
resist such inferences. Plato put it clearly in the Phaedo
where Socrates was sitting in prison awaiting his death,
discoursing on why he would not avail himself of the op-
portunity to escape. It was not because his body was made
up of bone and muscles, and that the muscles moved the
the bones at their joints by contraction and relaxation, nor
any other of ten thousand causes of the same sort which
could be given. The true cause was simply because he
thought it better and right to remain there and undergo
his sentence. PLATO, THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, 244 (B.
Jowett transl. 1924).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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time, we are not thinking about what he is at that same
point in time, but a complete abstraction-what he was at
some time previous to the act we are considering, what he
might have been, perhaps. Of course, what he was previously
or what he might have been would not have produced the
present act. Very simply, we deny that who it is that com-
mitted the act committed it, and instead prefer to think of
that present person in some other terms, terms which excuse
the present behavior 27
Psychiatry based on psychodynamic principles unques-
tionably relieves man of any responsibility for his acts. His
behavior is only part of a chain of predetermined natural
events. If such principles are accepted by the law as truths,
it makes no more sense to bring men under the judgement
of law for "causing" the death or injury of others than, for
instance, an avalanche, or any other natural phenomenon.
Such a posture is patently absurd. Why is a concept such as
mens rea meaningful in human affairs? As Holmes pungently
put it, "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked."28 It is no wonder that Freud argued against
his presuppositions being embraced by the law.29 Why the
body of psychiatrists as a whole have not done so is the
question.
2 For a good illustration of how contemporary thinkers are
continuing to miss the real point of the free will question,
see S. GLuECK, supra note 14, at 28-29.
28 HOLvES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (1881).
29 There is evidence that Freud on occasion saw through the
whole problem of individual responsibility. He once wrote:
"Must one assume responsibility for the content of one's
dreams? . . . Obviously one must hold oneself responsible
for the evil impulses of one's dreams. What else is one to
do with them? Unless the content of the dream (rightly
understood) is inspired by alien spirits, it is a part of my
own being." FREUD, Moral Responsibility for the Content
of Dreams 19 (1923); The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psyclological Works of Sigmund Freud 132 (1961).
19683
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There is no trick to rationalizing away any individual's
conduct 0 If sociology should enter the legal arena with the
same force as psychiatry (it is already present with consider-
able force in the post-conviction process), it could accomplish
about the same result without bothering with the question
of whether or not the defendant was mentally ill. A case in
point is State v. Rodriguez,31 where a reduced sentence was
given in part because of the cultural background of the de-
fendant. He had shot a person rather than retreat from his
threatening advances. In the Puerto Rican culture severe
ostracism results if one does not face up to his enemy. This
sociological argument carried considerable weight with the
court. Other more systematic sociological theories would ap-
parently have an even greater influence. According to Sheldon
Glueck "[t]here are a few cases where companions, parents
and the social order itself do not share responsibility for a
criminal offense."3 2 Why stop there? If society is responsible
for its members, who is responsible for society? If an in-
dividual is not responsible, how can a society be, for it is
then only a collection of individuals who are not respon-
sible. Perhaps it is the individual who is responsible for his
society; or, at best, there is mutual responsibility one for
the other, and the only way it can be maintained is to refuse
to excuse the individual from his part in it.
It would seem that while the law in some quarters will-
ingly has begun to accept the shackles of a psychodynamic
view of men, some within the field of psychiatry and re-
30 It was easy for Zeno to rationalize that Achilles could never
catch the tortise. First he must catch up to it half way, then
half of that, and half of that ad infinitum, as any distance
or number is infinitely divisible. The application of any
theory of determinism to human conduct, enabling the in-
dividual to evade responsibility for it, yields the same kind
of empty truth.
31 25 Conn. Supp. 350, 204 A.2d 37 (1964).
32 S. GLUEcK, supra note 14, at 17.
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lated disciplines are beginning to throw them off. Albert
Bandura and Richard Walters have written:
In some respects the widely accepted psychody-
namically based theories of psychopathology are domi-
nated by models provided by physical medicine. In
accordance with these models, behavior deviations are
frequently considered to be derivatives or symptoms of
underlying disease processes which disrupt social func-
tioning in a manner analogous to that in which toxic
substances affect the functioning of the body. This sym-
tom-underlying disease analogy is reflected in the use
of terms such as "mental health", "mental disease", and
"emotional disorder", and in the labeling of persons ex-
hibiting "patients" and even of cultural and subcultural
patterns as "sick", 'healthy" and "unhealthy" ....
Some clinicians who have adopted this medical model
hold the view that the basic pathology is somatic
in nature; the majority, however, regard the underlying
disturbance as a psychological rather than neurolgic
dysfunction. The latter employ symptom -underlying
disease models in which the "disease" is a function of
conscious or (more often) unconscious inner agents
akin to the supernatural forces that once provided the
explanatory concepts of physics, biology and (more
recently) medicine. General medicine has progressed
from the demonology that dominated it during the dark
ages; as scientific knowledge has increased, magical ex-
planations have been replaced by scientific ones. In con-
trast, theories of psychopathology, in which demons re-
appear in the guise of "psychodynamic forces", still re-
flect the mystical thinking that once predominated in
science. 33
This criticism of coventional psychiatry strikes at the
heart of all the recognized alternatives to M'Naghten. There
can be no question but that the Durham rule cannot withstand
the criticism. In its provision for release from criminal respon-
sibility if mental disease or defect produced the crime, Durham
clearly allows for non-organic types of disorders under the
33 BumuA M WALTERS, SocIAL LEARNING AND PERSOANLTrr
DEVELOPMNT 29-30 (1964).
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category of mental illness. In fact, as pointed out, under the
Durham rule defendants have been found not guilty when
psychiatric testimony convinced the jury they were mentally
ill and not responsible, even though there was no known
organic defect and no diagnosis other than psychopathic or
sociopathic personality. For Bandura and Walters, a typical
behavior is not necessarily "sick" behavior. For them, it would
seem, the Durham rule would be better suited to the dark
ages. A look at the other alternatives to M'Naghten reveals
the same vulnerability in them.34 The Royal Commission pro-
posal in its "incapable of preventing himself from" and the
Model Penal Code and Currens test in their "lacks capacity to
conform" fall into the same category as "irresistible impulse".
They beg the question of responsibility. In an era of psycho-
dynamic theory and psychogenic mental illness they give
simply too much to the psychiatrist-not because psychiatry
is a pseudo-science, which some say, 5 nor because it is an
infant science, which surely it is, but because at present its
s4 The Model Penal Code does indicate some recognition of
the weakness in Durham's breadth by its second point: "The
terms 'mental disease' or 'defect' do not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
anti-social conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955).
35 Dale G. Hardman, University of Missouri professor of social
work, said in his key note address to the Minnesota Correc-
tions Institute of 1962: "It is my firm conviction that Freud-
ian theory constitutes the greatest aggregation of pseudo-
scientific slop that has ever been compiled in the history
of science; that it has retarded the progress of social work
for fifty years .... "
Ernest Nagel has said regarding psychoanalytic theory:
"[A] theory must not be formulated in such a manner that
it can always be construed and manipulated so as to ex-
plain whatever the actual facts are, no matter whether con-
trolled observation shows one state of affairs to obtain or
its opposite." E. NAGEL, METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN PSYCHO-
ANALYTIC THEORY, PSYCHOANALYSIS, SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND
PHILOSOPHY 38 (1959).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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most cherished dogma offers not the slightest means by which
men may regulate in an orderly fashion their relationships
with each other. We have seen how the true thrust of psycho-
dynamic theory eliminates responsibility and morality al-
together. Judge Bazelon, feeling this is as it should be, wrote:
"The legal process differs from religion in that being concerned
with factual decisions, it cannot utter moral imperatives." 36
Such a precept can be followed only so far. Lon Fuller, in
The Morality of the Law, suggests:
Legal morality can be said to be neutral over a wide
range of ethical issues. It cannot be neutral in its view
of man himself. To embark on the enterprise of subject-
ing human conduct to the governance of rules involves
of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or
can become, a responsible agent, capable of under-
standing and following rules, and answerable for his
defaults. 37
To see how psychiatry's development of the psychogenic
class of mental illnesses has also misled those searching for
a workable test of responsibility, one should study the work
of Dr. Thomas Szasz, a practicing psychiatrist. Perhaps no
one has attacked psychiatry and psychiatry's influence upon
the law more vehemently or thoroughly than Szasz. In
two highly controversial books, The Myth of Mental III-
ness38 and Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry,39 Szasz develops
in great depth the position that there is actually no such
thing as mental illness. Because of the obvious implications
which a pronouncement such as "mental illness does not exist"
has in regard to all legal reforms in the area of criminal re-
sponsibility from M'Naghten to this day, lengthy consideration
is due it.
Szasz, in historically reviewing how the concept of mental
86 Bazelon, supra note 22.
37 L. FuLLER, THE MoRALrrY o THE LAW 162, (1964).88 T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MNTAL ILLNTss (1961).
89 T. SZASz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963).
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illness arose, uses hysteria as a paradigm. He points out that
hysteria gained the attention of the early neuropsychiatrists,
and that its study eventually led to the differentiation of neu-
rology and psychiatry. This is widely recognized to be his-
torically accurate. Jean Charcot, teacher of Sigmund Freud,
developed an interest in patients whose symptoms were the
same as those with verified neurological diseases, but in
whom no such disease could be found. He took the position
that they were suffering from a real illness rather than feign-
ing one, to gain sympathy or for some other motive. These
nervous disorders, in spite of having no known cause, had been
termed hysteria; but until Charcot, those with the symptoms
were judged more often to be malingerers rather than hysterics.
Because of Charcot's great reputation at the time, people were
willing to accept his diagnosis of this problem as a "functional
nervous illness" rather than an organic illness or malingering.
Szasz maintains that Charcot made his diagnosis, or took
the position he did, as an act of social reform or to remove
from the physician the fear that he was perhaps being de-
frauded, or both, rather than from compelling empirical or
scientific evidence. The hysteric had been sneered at, had
been an outcast, and his physician had been discredited before
Charcot gave dignity to his condition by labeling it an "illness".
It would seem that Freud, whose works Szasz cites in this re-
gard, was also as much moved by the social and professional
considerations involved as by the medical ones.
In any case, Freud did accept and pass on Charcot's re-
classification of hysterics and went much further himself with
the whole classification process. According to Szasz, Charcot
and Freud did not discover that hysterics were mentally ill.
They advocated that they be declared mentally ill. From the
point of view of science and intellectual integrity, this was a
grievous error. About reclassifying, Szasz said:
Since all systems of classification are made by peo-
ple, it is necessary to be aware of who has made the rules
and for what purpose. If this precaution is not taken,
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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there is the risk of being unaware of the precise rules,
or worse, of mistaking the product of classification for
"naturally occurring facts or things". I believe this is
exactly what happened in psychiatry during the past
sixty or seventy years. During this period a vast number
of occurrences were reclassified as "illnesses". We have
thus come to regard phobias, delinquencies, divorce,
homicide, addiction, and so on almost without limit as
psychiatric illnesses. This is a colossal and c o st 1 y
mistake.40
Szasz examines current concepts of mental illness from
two possible points of view, as a "sign of brain disease" and
as a "name for problems in living." He acknowledges that
one school of psychiatric thought still holds to the belief that
all so-called mental illness is caused by some neurological
defect, even though medical science as yet is not able to de-
termine what the defect is in all cases. This Szasz cannot
accept because it implies that "people's troubles cannot be
caused by conflicting personal needs, opinions, social aspira-
tions, values and so forth."41 Besides, he says, it is mislead-
ing and unnecessary for the concept of mental illness to be
used in reference to those suffering from brain disease be-
cause it is actually a physical illness.
For Szasz the symptoms most widely labeled mental ill-
ness today are really simply problems in living. Since the
concept of illness implies deviation from some norm, psy-
chiatry must first establish the norm if it is to diagnose any-
thing as illness. In the physical illnesses, for instance, the norm
might be the natural functioning of an organ, which may be
objectively verified. But what is the natural function of the
mind? Because psychiatrists have never been able to reach
any agreement on this question does not mean simply that
they have set for themselves a harder task. It means, rather,
40 T. SZASz, supra note 36, at 43.
41 T. SzAsz, supra note 37, at 12.
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that they have set for themselevs an improper task, that
such a question is outside the scope of medicine.4 2
Thus Szasz has been led to conclude:
Psychiatric activity is medical in name only. For
the most part, psychiatrists are engaged in attempts to
change the behavior and values of individuals, groups,
institutions, and sometimes even nations. Hence, psy-
chiatry is a form of social engineering. It should be
recognized as such 43
From these basic points of Szasz's argument, it is clear
he opposes the writing into law of any excusing conditions
for criminal behavior based upon "mental illness". The two
major themes of his work are: (1) It is a mistake to label prob-
lems in living as mental illness (or as any kind of illness),
and (2) in so far as mental illness, as that term is understood
today, consists of problems in living, why should we turn to
medical science for explanations and treatment of these
problems?
It seems reasonable to ask, before a person or a group
of persons is pronounced expert in some human study, just
how the person or group has distinguished itself in handling
or answering the problems involved in that study. Szasz has
asked that question, and he is still waiting for an answer.
Along this same line of thought, Dr. 0. Hobart Mowrer,
Research Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois,
has written:
For more than a decade now, it has been evident
that something is seriously amiss in contemporary psy-
chiatry and clinical psychology. Under the sway of
42 It is interesting to note that Judge Bazelon used very similar
language in the Durham opinion to explain why the law
should not try to define insanity: "In attempting to define
insanity in terms of a symptom, the courts have assumed an
impossible role, not merely one for which they have no
special competence." 214 F.2d at 872.
4 T. SzAsz, supra note 37 at vii.
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Freudian psychoanalysis, these disciplines have not vali-
dated themselves either diagnostically or therapeutically.
Their practitioners, as persons, have not manifested any
exceptional grasp on the virtues and strengths they pur-
portedly help others to acquire. And the impact of their
philosophy of life and conception of man in society as a
whole has been subtly subversive.4 4
Why would the impact of the "philosophy of life" of psy-
chiatry be termed subversive? Szasz answers that it, "under-
mines the principle of personal responsibility, upon which a
democratic political system is necessarily based, by assigning
to an external source (i.e. the illness) the blame for antisocial
behavior. '45
Beyond Szasz's criticism, there seems to be a crucial logical
error in psychiatry's conception of mental illness and criminal
behavior, and thus in any legal ruling, such as Durham, which
finds or allows to be found that mental illness produced a
criminal act. How is mental illness (of the functional type)
diagnosed? It is done by observing and examining the sub-
ject's behavior in all its forms. How is mental illness defined?
It is defined in terms of behavior. Then what is mental illness?
It is no more than certain types of behavior. Therefore to say
that mental illness causes certain types of behavior, for ex-
ample, criminal, is to say that behavior causes behavior. Or,
to say that criminal behavior is a form of mental illness rules
out finding that mental illness ever causes criminal behavior.4 6
If psychiatrists deny that mental illness is certain types of
behavior, but instead causes certain types of behavior, they
44 Mowrer, Foreword to W. GLASSER, REAITY THERAPY at xi
(1965).
45 T. SZASZ, supra note 36, at 297.
-6 Psychiatrists apparently are not bothered by this bit of
illogic. "The average psychiatrist's attitude toward criminal
behavior seems to embody, as a basic assumption, that such
behavior is prima facie evidence of mental illness." De
Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. Cm. L. REv.
337, 342-43 (1955).
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must lapse into complete mysticism to explain just what men-
tal illness is, which they, as Bandura and Walters point out,47
are quite willing to do. Again the problem is that they will not
acknowledge that they do. Plainly, psychiatrists cannot oper-
ate if they are not allowed to define mental illness in terms
of behavior.48
This is not merely a word game. The point to be made is
that the law functions as if it understands mental illness to be
something which happens to a person, which robs him of his
free will, of his responsibility; 49 whereas actually, if it is any-
thing at all, it is only a way in which he behaves. More im-
portantly, it is a way in which he chooses to behave. If the
so-called functionally mentally ill person does not choose to
behave the way he does, then no one chooses to behave the way
he does. Thus, no one is responsible. This the law cannot af-
ford to acknowledge.
Does it seem harsh or inhumane to say a person chooses
to behave in a "mentally ill" way? It should not, for to believe
anything else, and for him to be told anything else, is to admit
the hopelessness of the condition, and to convince him of its
hopelessness.
This theme has been expounded very recently by Dr.
William Glasser in a revolutionary book entitled Reality Ther-
apy.50 It is plausible to think of the person called mentally ill
as one actually suffering from an acute case of dishonesty, both
with himself and with others. He does not like the world the
way he finds it so he begins to tell small lies to himself about
-1 Supra, note 31.
48 But psychiatrists have operated under Durham because of
the looseness of their theory as shown by Nagel and others
and because of their attitude that criminal behavior is prima
facie evidence of mental illness.
49 Durham is the best example, but see also Warren v. State,
243 Ind. 508, 188 N.E.2d 108 (1963) and Dugan v. Common-
wealth, 333 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1960).
50 W. GLASSER, REALiTY THERAPY, (1965).
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it in order to make it more acceptable. If he dislikes it enough
his lies become great enough that others can plainly see
something is wrong with him. Something is, but it is not ill-
ness. Glasser calls it irresponsibility. His therapy is based
upon getting people to accept responsibility and to face real-
ity. It is everything that conventional psychotherapy is not.
The following are some of the major ways in which it is
different:
Conventional psychiatry believes firmly that mental
illness exists ....
Because we do not accept the concept of mental ill-
ness, the patient cannot become involved with us as a
mentally ill person who has no responsibility for his
behavior.
Conventional psychiatry holds that an essential part
of treatment is probing into the patient's past life ....
Working in the present and toward the future, we
do not get involved with the patient's history because
we can neither change what happened to him nor accept
the fact that he is limited by his past.
Conventional psychotherapy . . . emphasizes that if
the patient is to change he must gain understanding and
insight into his unconscious mind.
We do not look for unconscious conflicts or the rea-
sons for them. A patient cannot become involved with us
by excusing his behavior on the basis of unconscious
motivations.
Necessarily accompanying the conviction that men-
tal illness exists, conventional psychotherpy scrupul-
ously avoids the problem of morality, that is, whether
the patient's behavior is right or wrong. Deviant be-
havior is considered a product of the mental illness, and
the patient should not be held responsible because he is
considered helpless to do anything about it.
We emphasize the morality of behavior. We f a c e
the issue of right and wrong .... P
It is not a distortion of the proposed alternatives to
M'Naghten to say that: (1) they attempt to evade the issue
51 Id. at 42-44.
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of right and wrong; (2) they would sometimes excuse be-
havior on the basis of unconscious motivations; and (3) they
are based on the firm belief that functional mental illness
exists and that it may release people from responsibility for
their behavior.
Thus, the law today would, in many cases, interfere with
the return to normal behavior by a deviant as much as con-
ventional psychiatry has in the past.
Consider a defendant found "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" under present legal rulings. Upon his commitment to
a mental hospital for treatment, "reality therapy" could not
very well be employed since the law would have already
found him not responsible for his behavior in the same way
and for the same reasons that conventional psychiatry has
always done so; and it has shown itself no more successful in
correcting criminal behavior than traditional penal proce-
dures.52 Again the question must be asked: Why has the law
begun to accept the general principles of a theory of behavior
which has not yet produced any scientifically verified results?
There can be no doubt that the treatment or correction of
the offender is hampered by his being told he was not re-
sponsible for his offense. Henry Hart, Jr., has written regard-
ing "The Aims of the Criminal Law": "[I]t is the criminal law
which defines the minimum conditions of man's responsibility.
The assertion of social responsibility has value in the treat-
ment even of those who have become criminals. 5 3
52 Sol Rubin, Legal Counsel for the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, speaking on the trend from criminal to
civil commitments at the 1967 National Institute on Crime
and Delinquency, made it clear he would prefer seeing of-
fenders in traditional correctional programs rather than hos-
pitals. He observed that results produced by correctional
institutions would be shown by statistics to be better than
those of mental hospitals.
11 H. HART, THE Avims OF THE CRnImVAL LAW, LAW AND CoN-
TEwroPARY PROBLEMS 410 (Vol. 23, 1958).
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